Search results for "Normal-form game"
showing 7 items of 7 documents
A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma
2016
We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…
Novel threat-based AI strategies that incorporate adaptive data structures for multi-player board games
2016
This paper considers the problem of designing novel techniques for multi-player game playing, in a range of board games and configurations. Compared to the well-known case of two-player game playing, multi-player game playing is a more complex problem with unique requirements. To address the unique challenges of this domain, we examine the potential of employing techniques inspired by Adaptive Data Structures (ADSs) to rank opponents based on their relative threats, and using this information to achieve gains in move ordering and tree pruning. We name our new technique the Threat-ADS heuristic. We examine the Threat-ADS’ performance within a range of game models, employing a number of diffe…
Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
2008
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto op…
Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach
2008
We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…
Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs
2013
This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
A two-point boundary value formulation of a mean-field crowd-averse game
2014
Abstract We consider a population of “crowd-averse” dynamic agents controlling their states towards regions of low density. This represents a typical dissensus behavior in opinion dynamics. Assuming a quadratic density distribution, we first introduce a mean-field game formulation of the problem, and then we turn the game into a two-point boundary value problem. Such a result has a value in that it turns a set of coupled partial differential equations into ordinary differential equations.
Large Networks of Dynamic Agents: Consensus under Adversarial Disturbances
2012
This paper studies interactions among homogeneous social groups within the framework of large population games. Each group is represented by a network and the behavior described by a two-player repeated game. The contribution is three-fold. Beyond the idea of providing a novel two-level model with repeated games at a lower level and population games at a higher level, we also establish a mean field equilibrium and study state feedback best-response strategies as well as worst-case adversarial disturbances in that context.